RECYCLING PHILADELPHIA V. NEW JERSEY: THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, POSTINDUSTRIAL
"NATURAL" RESOURCES, AND THE SOLID WASTE
CRISIS
DAVID POMPERt

As the "garbage barges" of New York' and Philadelphia2 dramatically illustrate, many cities and states are discovering that their ability
to recycle or dispose of solid waste' lags behind their propensity to prot B.A. 1984, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Professor Frank Goodman, to Lecturer in Law Joseph Manko,
and to Jon Anderson and Rena Steinzor, for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts of
this Comment-and to Professors Gerald and Marlene Pomper for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts of both this Comment and myself. Responsibility for remaining
flaws in either is, of course, mine alone.
I See, e.g., Gutis, The End Begins for Trash No One Wanted, N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 1987, at B1, col. 3 (describing the end of the 162-day, 6000-mile odyssey of barge
Mobro as the New York City Sanitation Department begins processing its 3,100 tons
of trash); Soil on Troubled Waters, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1987, at A34, col. 1 (editorial) (wandering garbage barge from Islip, N.Y. symbolizes urgency of waste-disposal
problems).
2 See, e.g., Jaffe, Tons of City Ash Remain in Limbo on the High Seas, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 12, 1988, at B1, col. 1 (discussing two barges, long at sea, with
cargos of ash from Philadelphia municipal incinerators and no apparent destination).
3 The term "solid waste" is defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988)), as "any
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or
air-pollution control facility and other discarded material . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 6903
(27) (1982).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in regulations issued under the
RCRA, has adopted several variants of this definition, depending upon the subject matter of the regulation. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 2 40.101(y) (1988) (guidelines for thermal
processing of solid wastes); id. § 241.101(v) (guidelines for land disposal of residential,
commercial, and institutional solid waste); id. § 246.101(bb) (guidelines for sourceseparation of solid wastes); id. § 247.101(i) (guidelines for procurement of products
that contain recycled material); id. § 257.2 (criteria for classification of solid waste
disposal facilities and practices); 53 Fed. Reg. 33,405-33,406 (1988) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 258.2) (criteria for municipal solid waste landfills).
An EPA-sponsored study estimated that as of 1984, the 133 million ton "municipal solid waste stream" consisted primarily of paper products (37.1%), yard wastes
(17.9%), glass (9.7%), food wastes (8.1%), metals (9.6%), and plastics (7.2%). See
FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE
UNITED STATES 1960-2000 ch. 1, at 6, 8 (1986) (tables). Mirroring society, significant

trends in the composition of solid wastes include projected increases in small appliances
and consumer electronics, paper, containers, and packaging-particularly plastics. See
id. ch. 1 at 12-17. Solid waste broadly defined also includes an estimated 45 to 70
million tons per year of water treatment and sewage sludges, over 15 million tons of
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duce it.' According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), more than half of the states already face a "garbage crisis." 5
These states endeavor to export their waste to other states6 and foreign
countries 7 where disposal costs are lower. They also seek to protect
their own disposal capacity' by limiting access to disposal facilities to
their own residents and industries.9 Like radioactive waste before it,"0
street refuse, 100 million tons of nonhazardous industrial process waste, 86.3 million
tons of boiler and incinerator ash, and 20 million tons of car hulks; varying and largely
unknown portions of these wastes are also deposited in landfills. See id. ch. 2 at 8
(table).
" The average American discarded a net of 2.93 pounds of municipal solid waste
each day in 1984; this figure is expected to decrease slightly to 2.59 pounds per day by
century's end. See FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 21 (table). The nation's discards totaled 126.5 million tons in 1984 and are projected to increase marginally to 126.8 million tons over the same period. See id. ch. 1, at 6 (table). These figures
do not include the 6.5 million tons removed from the solid waste stream by incineration
(projected to rise to 32 million tons by the year 2000) but do include tonnages approximately half as large comprising the residues from incineration. See id. ch. 1, at 6 (table); id. ch. 2, at 5, 8 (table). Nor do they include recycling of 15.1 million tons, 10.2
percent of 1984 gross discards. See id. ch. 3, at 17.
' See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,321 (1988); see also Shabecoff, With No Room at the
Dump, U.S. Faces a GarbageCrisis, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1987, at B8, col. 1 (charting national solid waste disposal costs and flows, with international comparisons); Corrections, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1987, at A3, col. 1 (correcting previous day's figures for
Miami waste output).
I See Forester, Solid Waste: There's a Lot More Coming, E.P.A. J., May 1988, at
11, 11-12. See generally Kelly, Carrying the Load, ENVTL. F., March-Apr. 1988, at
17, 17-18 (surveying states' responses to the garbage crisis); State-By-State Analysis of
Solid Waste Programs and Costs, Inside EPA's Envtl. Pol'y Alert, Apr. 20, 1988, at 1
(same); State Survey Part II, Inside EPA's Envtl. Pol'y Alert, May 4, 1988, at 1
(same). New Jersey, the nation's most densely populated state, already exports 54% of
its solid waste to six surrounding states. See id.
See After 2 Years, Ship Dumps Toxic Ash, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988, at A22,
col. 3 (noting the mysterious finale of the global odyssey of a barge laden with toxic ash
which apparently dumped its contents in Singapore); Ash Ships Headfor Africa, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1988, § 1, at 24, col. 1 (noting rising public anger in West Africa at
industrial nations' attempts to dump waste there).
" This Comment uses the term "disposal capacity" to mean space in landfills or a
combination of processing capacity in resource recovery (trash-to-steam) facilities and
landfill space for the ash that these plants generate. Nationwide, 92% of solid waste is
disposed of in landfills. See Forester, supra note 6, at 11.
9 See sources cited supra note 6.
'0 Seeking to protect the nation's nuclear program and responding to citizens' antipathy to radioactive waste transportation and disposal, Congress followed a two-track
approach to siting disposal facilities. Congress initiated a long national process to select
a single storage location for high-level radioactive waste. The siting process, conducted
by the Department of Energy, met with stiff opposition at every proposed location. See,
e.g., Knudson, Bullfrog County, Nev., (Pop. 0) Fights Growth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (describing Nevada's attempt to discourage selection by establishing the proposed site as "Bullfrog County," with no population, no government, and
astronomical property taxes). Despite continuing problems, the Department has provisionally settled on a site in Nevada adjoining a nuclear weapons testing ground. See
Schneider, Suddenly, Nuclear Waste Looks Very Visible Again, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1988, at E4, col. 1. But see Wald, Work is Faltering on U.S. Repositoryfor Atomic
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solid waste is becoming hot-though this time only in a political, not a
physical, sense.
The Supreme Court rejected an early attempt by a state to refuse
all exogenous refuse in Philadelphiav. New Jersey." Applying a dormant commerce clause analysis, the Court ruled that New Jersey was
violating the Constitution by requiring nonresidents to bear the full
burden of preserving one of New Jersey's natural resources-open land
suitable for landfilling. 2 Under the Court's reasoning, New Jersey did
not "own" that resource and, therefore, had no right to hoard it. Leaving a loophole, however, the Court did not question a state's power to
"restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources

. . .

or...

spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses.""
Not surprisingly, states are taking advantage of that opening. In
four recent cases, Maryland, 4 the District of Columbia, 5 Oregon, 6
and Rhode Island' 7 thwarted challenges to their decisions to exclude
exogenous garbage from landfills that they or their subdivisions owned
and operated. Since 81% of the nation's landfills are owned and operated by state or local government,' the practical impact of these rulings
on the interstate transportation of solid waste is to let the exception
swallow the Philadelphiav. New Jersey rule.
Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (noting that work is behind schedule
and over budget).
Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573,
94 Stat. 3347, superseded by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-j
(Supp. IV 1986)), Congress made states responsible for disposing of all low-level radioactive waste produced within their borders, see 42 U.S.C. § 2021c (Supp. IV 1986),
while encouraging states to form compacts to operate regional disposal facilities. See 42
U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). Seven regional compacts comprising 44 states
have so far received congressional consent. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1859 (1986)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021d (Supp. IV 1986)). This approach has had mixed re-

sults. See, e.g., Wald, A Time of Decision Nears on Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (radioactive waste disposal problem has intensified as a result
of 1980 Act).

11437 U.S. 617 (1978).
12 See id. at 628-29.
's See id. at 627 n.6 (citations omitted).
14 See County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 221-22, 473 A.2d 12, 21-22
(1984).
"I See Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134
(D.D.C. 1984).
18 See Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127,
132 (D. Or. 1986).
17 See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211-12 (D.R.I. 1987).
18 See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (1988) (noting that municipal solid waste landfills are
owned predominantly by local governments (80%) with an additional 1% owned by
state governments).
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Lefrancois v. Rhode Island offers a particularly compelling example because it involved the only generic-waste landfill in Rhode Island
and the largest landfill still operating in New England.19 Yet the federal district court upheld a Rhode Island statute that instituted a complete ban on the dumping of exogenous wastes at the landfill despite
the landfill's regional importance.20 The Lefrancois holding will no
doubt prove tempting to other states seeking to restrict waste
importation. 2
The Lefrancois court reached the correct result. But the rule conditioning the power to exclude wastes on public ownership and operation of disposal facilities is based on a questionably drawn constitutional doctrine, the market participant exception, which is applied to an
overly narrow view of the disposal market. Part I of this Comment will
redraw the market participant exception to the dormant commerce
clause in light of its function in courts' initial balancing of federal and
state interests. Part II will then apply that framework to argue that a
broadened exception should allow states to hoard "natural" resources
that they have either created or actively preserved. Part III will examine the impact of this approach on the constitutionality of several
means by which states are likely to attempt to conserve disposal
capacity.
I.

THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE

The dormant commerce clause empowers courts to strike down
state laws that restrict free interstate commerce. The market participant
exception protects state laws that affect only parties who transact business with the enacting state or its subdivisions. Section A of this Part
sets forth reasons for reading the dormant commerce clause into article
I, section 8 of the Constitution, and develops a general theory of the
judiciary's role in applying the clause. Section B discusses the development and purpose of the market participant exception, suggesting that
discrimination based on state residence is sometimes a legitimate goal
that the exception enables states then to pursue. Section C then argues
18
20

See Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1206.
See id. at 1207-12 (upholding R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19-13.1 (Supp. 1988)).

The statute superseded a contractual agreement, pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1913.1 (1985), under which the plaintiff was allowed to bring exogenous waste to Central
Landfill so long as it exported an equal amount of waste from the state. See Lefrancois,
669 F. Supp. at 1206, 1218.
21 See Kelly, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that Ohio's Attorney General backed
legislation restricting waste importation, believing it to be constitutional because of recent court rulings).
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that under this rationale, the market participant exception should be
limited to cases where a state (1) is entitled to pursue a discriminatory
end, and (2) pursues the end through appropriate, minimally burdensome means.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

The Framers called the Constitutional Convention largely to enact
the commerce clause.22 For the first century of constitutional interpretation, the "negative" or "dormant" aspect of the clause was the most
vital.2 3 This aspect empowers courts to strike down state legislation
conflicting with the nationalizing policies -of the commerce clause,
thereby restricting the states even while Congress sleeps on its power to
preempt them.2 4 The clause's "positive" aspect grants power to Congress, the scope and use of which have mushroomed since the 1887
Interstate Commerce Act.25 Under current doctrine, Congress has essentially unlimited power to regulate economic activity. 6 Significantly,
Congress may both void state laws that the dormant commerce clause
would authorize, and authorize state laws that the dormant commerce
clause would void.27 Despite its constitutional origins, then, the dormant commerce clause functions as a doctrine of federal common
law-decisions under it remain open to congressional review."
Commentary debating when courts fully subject to congressional
review should apply the dormant commerce clause can be grouped into
22 See Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 1335, 1337-38 (1934); see also Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091,
1114 n.55 (1986) (asserting that the Framers' fear of protectionism and retaliation was
real but probably was not based on actual experience under the Articles of
Confederation).
23 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 306-07 (2d ed.
1988).
24 Congress's power to preempt derives not from the commerce clause, but from
the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 749 (1978).
25 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
28 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of wheat grown for consumption on the farm). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 23, §§ 5-4 to 5-6 (analyzing the contemporary view of the commerce clause powers).
17 See Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507,
521
(1947); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418-427 (1946); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
28 See Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1975); see also Redish & Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569, 601-03 (explaining the common-law status of commerce clause
jurisprudence).
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three approaches. 9 The first approach argues that the possibility of
congressional review frees the courts to make value-oriented decisions
under the dormant commerce clause. The proponents of this approach
go on to argue that courts should pursue economic efficiency by way of
free trade.3 0 The second approach argues that the courts should forego
substantive review and police only procedure, scrutinizing state laws
that discriminate against interests unrepresented in state politics. 3 ' Oth29 Some scholars have advanced a fourth approach-that courts should never apply the dormant commerce clause. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 28 at 617; see also
Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned
Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 91-97 (1980) (advocating this approach in the natural
resources context). Whatever the merits of such critiques of the dormant commerce
clause, it is unrealistic to expect the Court to abandon a doctrine that has been an
important and firmly-rooted part of its federalism jurisprudence since Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-19 (1851). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 23, §§ 6-2 to 6-4 (discussing the history of judicial review of state regulation of
interstate commerce). The existence and shape of exceptions to the dormant commerce
clause therefore remain live issues; debate on them should be framed by proposing, at
least at the outset, a valid basis for the general doctrine. See generally R. DWORKIN,
LAW's EMPIRE 45-86 (1986) (arguing that a proper "interpretive attitude" requires an
attempt to interpret generously the purpose of a legal rule before making decisions
concerning the proper limits of the rule).
Without attempting here to respond in depth to these global critiques, it should
also be noted that the problem of congressional inertia in the face of political polarization may present an even greater threat than congressional acceptance of economic inefficiency. Even if the Constitution demands judicial tolerance of the latter problem, as
Professors Redish and Nugent assert, see Redish & Nugent, supra note 28, at 592-99,
hostility to the polarizing force of deliberately and unjustifiably discriminatory state
laws is implicit in the very concept of a national constitution. Many members of Congress, moreover, are probably aware of Congress's fallibility in guarding against that
threat. Congress is therefore institutionally "happy" to let stand a doctrine that delegates police duties to a politically less accountable branch. Cf Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1635-38 (1988) (commending as pragmatic Congress's use of
"veiling" delegation strategies for ensuring that hard choices get made).
30 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 23, 45-46 (1983) (arguing that courts should maximize the "market" influence
of competition among jurisdictions in defining the boundary between federal and state
rules by linking "monopoly overcharges" to the polity adopting the regulation);
Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 56770 (1983) (advocating a blend of "process" and "values" justifications for judicial intervention on behalf of free trade). See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW §§ 26.1 to 26.7 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the "economics of federalism").
31 See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROcEss 205-06 (1980) (arguing that the fact that "[sltate and local legislatures contain no
• . . representatives of the central government, or of those persons outside the jurisdiction upon whom the impact of local laws may fall" provides a rationale for the courts'
superintendence); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83-84 (1980) (arguing that the
privileges and immunities clause and "self-operating dimension" given to the commerce
clause by the Supreme Court are protective devices helping to guarantee "virtual representation"); L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-5 (discussing contemporary doctrine and the
theme of political representation); Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 437-447 (1982) (urging that current dormant commerce clause
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erwise, economic efficiency would be constitutionally privileged above
other values that state legislatures may pursue, and values that Congress may deliberately have sought to protect through its past
3 2

inaction.

Both of these approaches present problems. Even if we were to
accept economic efficiency as privileged, 3 it is far from clear why judicial review is the appropriate mechanism for examining state laws burdening this efficiency. The fact that inefficient state laws remain open
to congressional review suggests that Congress should bear responsibility for reviewing such laws. Indeed, state laws that burden the national
economy may be the ones most likely to attract congressional review. 34
Furthermore, nonrepresentation of nonresidents is not a procedural
flaw; rather, it is fundamental to our federal system in which states
retain a measure of independence from the national government.3 5
doctrine be replaced by a process-reinforcing approach rooted instead in the privileges
and immunities clause); Smith, State DiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1209-10 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's use of political
process rationales invalidating discriminatory state regulations); Tushnet, Rethinking
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 130-41 (analyzing the different forms of discrimination that state regulation might effect and arguing that each
raises different "process" implications for judicial review).
32 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 31, at 441-43 (criticizing value-oriented approaches
to the dormant commerce clause).
33 See generally Comment, Hood v. Dumond: A Study of the Supreme Court and
the Ideology of Capitalism, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 657, 682-88 (1985) (arguing that the
majority opinion in that case effected a dramatic shift in commerce clause analysis toward protecting a national free market).
3' The point is not that Congress typically produces economically efficient legislation. Indeed, it does not. See D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
125-33 (1974); Fitts, supra note 29, at 1579-84. See generally Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971) (analyzing legislation
as a market in which firms deliver votes and other resources to politicians in exchange
for applications of state power, such as subsidies, entry barriers, and price fixes, that
give them concentrated benefits while arousing only dispersed, hence ineffective, opposition). The point is that nationally inefficient legislation that can pass in individual
states will often lose on the national level. The same nationally organized economic
special interests that dominate Congress and make it inefficient, see Olson, The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

GROWTH 19-23 (D. Mueller ed. 1983), may pressure Congress into preempting burdensome and/or conflicting state laws. See Elliot, Ackerman, & Millian, Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 313, 327 (1985) (arguing that the sudden emergence of federal environmental law resulted from industry's desire to preempt stringent and inconsistent laws
obtained by nascent environmental organizations at the state level).
To save its scarce time, Congress can delegate the policing of state laws to administrative agencies. A first step in what may be such an administrative preemption process has already been taken in the field of landfill policy. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
" See Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 380-90 (arguing that independent state
governments supported by constituencies smaller and varying in composition from na-
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In failing to suggest a role for the courts in reinforcing the congressional process, both of the approaches discussed above assume that
Congress is a perfect protector of national interests. Yet as the Supreme
Court recently recognized in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority,36 states retain great influence in Congress. Dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence should take Garcia seriously and recognize that the states' influence is capable of thwarting Congress's role as
protector of the national interest.3 7 While Congress remains likely to
respond to economically inefficient state regulations,38 it is less likely to
encourage broad participation or promptly to mend tears in the political fabric of the union. 9 Whether or not the possibility of such failure
may ever warrant judicial invalidation of congressional action under the
positive commerce clause, it should at least inform judicial action under
the dormant commerce clause. Moreover, courts reviewing state laws
are at least as competent to evaluate a law's threat to political unity as
its economic impact.
This Comment, therefore, joins a third approach taken by prior
commentary:40 the courts should wield the dormant commerce clause
tional interest groups provide both an important bulwark against tyranny and support
for citizen participation).
36 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985).
' See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 31, at 185-90 (focusing on the happy conclusion that "the federal political branches are fully capable of guarding against the states'
being swallowed by a central monolith," but conceding in passing that "Madison's pessimistic forecast-that 'measures will too often be decided according to their probable
effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests,
and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual states'-has been markedly realized" (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed.
1888))); D.

MAYHEW,

supra note 34, at 53-59 (arguing that members of Congress

gain more by providing particularized benefits limited to their own district than by
joining with others to provide broader benefits).
's See Redish & Nugent, supra note 28, at 605.
' See Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 388.
[Since] federal legislators are primarily tied to the constituencies that elect
them (that is, in practice, to the already-often nationally-organized interest groups in their districts), then they do not have any special incentive
to strengthen the state governmental machinery which may be the most
important factor in readjusting the local configuration of forces that in
turn influences the actions of the national representatives.
Id.; see also A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 88 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
The [legislatively centralized] social power . . . is constantly changing
hands, because it is subordinate to the power of the people. It often forgets
the maxims of wisdom and foresight in the consciousness of its strength.
Hence arises its danger. Its vigor, and not its impotence, will probably be

the cause of its ultimate destruction.
Id.
40 See Regan, supra note 22, at 1113-15 (asserting that protectionism is objectionable because it is fundamentally incompatible with the concept of political union and it
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primarily to void state laws that so threaten the health of the national
political process that they ought not stand unless Congress expressly
authorizes them.4 1 In other words, courts should consider whether a
Congress focused on preserving and enriching the political culture of
the Union would have authorized states to pass the challenged law. If
the net effect of applying a state law is to strengthen the national political process, then the law should survive dormant commerce clause review. This third approach synthesizes the efficiency-oriented and process-reinforcing approaches. It takes from the former the idea that
because dormant commerce clause courts are really acting as commonlaw courts, they are free to pursue "legislative" ends; it takes from the
latter the idea that they should pursue ends likely to be underemphasized by the actual legislature. This view aims to "reinforce" the
political process in the way that steel reinforces concrete-making its
intact structure stronger, rather than plugging its leaks by correcting
individual bad decisions.
B.

The Market ParticipantException

This Section argues that the market participant exception makes
sense as a corollary of the general principle that the dormant commerce
clause should be applied to preserve the health of the national political
process. It must first be admitted, however, that the historical stated
purpose of the exception has been a different one: preserving the questionable value of "state sovereignty."
is likely to set off escalating cycles of resentment and retaliation); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 493 (1981) (advancing on
more formalistic grounds a jurisprudence of state "citizenship" that would have substantially the same application); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 405-08 (advancing, as a limit to Congress's power under the positive commerce clause, a jurisprudence similarly aimed at preserving and enhancing the national political process).
41 The three approaches to the dormant commerce clause discussed in the text
posit three alternative roles for the courts: free-trade enforcing, power balancing, and
structure-preserving. These alternatives correspond, but not in chronological order, to
the three phases of Professor Hurst's American history: the release of energy through
the establishment of a national free-trade zone (1800-1870), the balancing of power
(1870-1900), and the constitution and preservation of the Union (1776-1800). See J.
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

39-42 (1956). Hurst argues that "the Court, rather than Congress,
led in protecting multi-state areas of economic maneuver" through the dormant commerce clause and other aspects of commercial law. Id. at 50. This Comment argues
that since Congress has more or less grasped that baton, the Court should move full
circle to focus on preserving political unity.
UNITED STATES
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1. The Development of the Exception
The market participant exception has a brief history. Consistent
with the national-free-market origins of the dormant commerce clause,
the exception was born in a case affirming privatization. In American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 42 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a
federal district court decision upholding, against commerce clause attack, a Florida statute requiring that the state's public documents be
printed within the state. The district court first noted that a state
purchasing labor or materials acts as trustee for its residents.4 3 Impliedly, therefore, the state should be free to favor its own citizens even
when a private purchaser would not. The court's major concern, however, was the potential interference with state proprietary activity if its
every job specification were subject to commerce clause attack.44 While
the district court's rationale was largely unsupported by precedent,4 5
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision without discussing
the market participant exception.
The Supreme Court first explicitly adopted the market participant
exception in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp." In that case the
Court upheld a statute whereby Maryland, in order to help rid the
state of abandoned automobiles, paid a bounty to licensed scrap processors that crushed hulks.47 Virginia scrap processors challenged the statute because it rendered them ineligible for bounties unless they met
documentation requirements more stringent than those imposed on Maryland processors. 48 Writing for a six-member majority, Justice Powell
reasoned that "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks,
or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has
entered into the market itself to bid up their price."'49 Therefore, "Maryland's action . . . was [not] the kind of action with which the Com42

41
41
41

409 U.S. 904 (1972), afl'g, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
See American Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 721.

See id. at 725 & n.36.

See id. at 724 nn.27 & 29. For a discussion and criticism of early state court
precedents, see Blumoff, The State ProprietaryException to the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A PersistentNineteenth-Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 73, 85-101.
46 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
41 See id. at 809-10 (upholding MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 , §§ 5-201, 5-205 (1970
& Supp. 1975), repealed by Acts of 1977, ch. 14, § 1). The statute defined "hulks" as
inoperative automobiles over eight years old. See id. at 798.
4' The extra burden on out-of-state processors was contained in an amendment to
the statute, and the amendment brought the suit. But the Court held that the statute
was to be considered as though the loophole had been sealed from the start. See id. at
809.
49 Id. at 806.
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merce Clause is concerned.""0
In its next two opinions under the market participant exception,
the Court expanded the doctrine. While in both Alexandria Scrap and
American Yearbook the states were purchasers of services, the Court
expanded the exception to uphold South Dakota's decision to sell cement manufactured at a state-owned factory only to state residents. 5' In
a later case, the Court applied the exception even though the state was
the purchaser only in the loose sense of hiring subcontractors through a
private general contractor.5 2
After this period of initial fecundity, the Court for the first time
rejected a state defense under the market participant exception in
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.5' The vitality
of the market participant exception has seemed especially questionable
since Garcia5 4 overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.55 Alexandria Scrap and NationalLeague of Cities were closely related; the two
decisions were announced on the same day and drew support from the
same five Justices. National League of Cities applied the tenth amendment as a limit to congressional power; it was not a dormant commerce
clause case. However, the Alexandria Scrap exception was based
partly on similar controversial notions of inherent state authority to
avoid federal preemption.5 6 While National League of Cities lowered
the ceiling on federal power over the states, and Alexandria Scrap
poked a hole in the floor of state obligations to the Union, the effect of
both cases was to enhance the states' power at the expense of national
uniformity.
Id. at 805.
11 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
52 In White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
211 n.7, 214-15 (1983), the Court applied the exception to general contractors purchasing subcontractors' services on behalf of the city of Boston. See infra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
53 467 U.S. 82, 95-99 (1984); see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306
(11th ed. 1985) (noting that Wunnicke was "the first Court ruling to reject a state
defense under the market participant exception") (emphasis removed); see also infra
notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing Wunnicke).
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
'5426 U.S. 833 (1976).
51 See id. at 842-52 and Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809, for the pertinent
sections of each decision which contributed to the controversy. This Comment assumes,
however, that Garciawill remain good law despite the controversy and the possibility
of National League of Cities rising from its grave. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 580
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming that the NationalLeague of Cities principle "will,
I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court"). The
assumption of unlimited congressional power presents a useful polar case, greatly simplifying the discussion. Any limits on congressional power to position the national economy in our increasingly interdependent world are likely to be slight.
50
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Despite its origination in a case related to National League of
Cities, the market participant exception has apparently survived. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun recently reiterated the
validity of the doctrine in Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor,
and Human Relations v. Gould.57 However, the Court refused to apply the doctrine to that case, holding that congressional action had preempted the state law at issue.5 8 And in New Energy Co. v. Limbach,"9
the Court again unanimously endorsed the doctrine while declining to
apply it. Significantly, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion. While Justice
Powell, the author of Alexandria Scrap, has retired, six of the eight
current Justices who have faced the issue while on the Court have
joined at least one majority opinion applying the exception to uphold a
discriminatory state law.60 Since Gould and New Energy mark the second and third consecutive cases 61 in which the Court has declined to
apply the exception, however, an examination of its underpinnings is
warranted.
2.

The Basis for the Exception

An examination of the rationale behind the market participant exception can be simplified by using, as a conceptual device, a hypothetical congress focused on making the federal system work. As discussed
above, courts interpreting the dormant commerce clause should emulate
such a congress rather than focus on economic efficiency.6 2 Such a congress would localize decisionmaking in order to foster broad participation, even at the risk of allowing economically inefficient outcomes. It
would strive to preserve states' abilities to respond to particularly local
concerns and values. It would give states great leeway when experimen57 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986).
58 The issue was whether a Wisconsin law, under which the state in its procurement boycotted repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), was
preempted by the NLRA. The Court decided that the state law was preempted and
that the market participant doctrine was no shield against preemption. See id. at 28691.
59 108 S. Ct. 1803, 1809 (1988).

"' Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, and Stevens joined now-Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204, 205 (1983). Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430 (1980). Justice Scalia recognized the validity of the doctrine
in dictum in New Energy, 108 S. Ct. at 1809. Justice Kennedy has not yet had occasion
to rule on the issue, nor did he as a circuit judge. Only Justice White has continuously
dissented from applications of the doctrine. See Regan, supra note 22, at 1284 & n.534.
"1 The first case in which the Court refused to apply the doctrine was SouthCentral Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 95-99. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
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tation was needed to inform national action.6 3 And it would prohibit
most purposefully discriminatory state laws. 4 For both philosophical
and practical reasons, however, it would authorize state laws that discriminate in order to reserve to state residents public goods paid for or
created by state residents. Philosophically,
in the absence of special circumstances, only the members of
a group providing a service have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Like other groups free to combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to be shared among
the group, political communities, including states, have a
prima facie justification for limiting distribution of their
public goods to those who combined to provide them. 6
Practically, just as property must be privatized in order to preserve the
incentive to husband it, 6 a doctrine allowing states to withhold resources they have created or collected is necessary to preserve the incentive for states to act. Such a doctrine may appear to sanction mere selfishness if viewed from an ex post perspective, ignoring the ex ante
incentive effects. 7 Yet without it, the public goods created by state activities, far from being enjoyed nationally, would simply disappear. 8
Along with it would disappear the incentive to participate (or more
precisely, the opportunity to build organizations that reward participation) in state politics. And along with that would disappear a major
reinforcement rod in the national political process.6 9 Moreover, once
the "Lockean" 70 labor-value basis for this exception is widely understood, these types of state acts are unlikely to provoke hostility or cycles
"I See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
64 See Regan, supra note 22, at 1110-37 (presenting the case for striking down
state acts having a protectionist purpose).
65 Varat, supra note 40, at 523; see also Wells & Hellerstein, The GovernmentalProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1130-31 (1980)
(suggesting that a justification for maintaining the government-proprietary distinction
embodied in the market participation exception to the dormant commerce clause is
"state fiscal autonomy in spending its money or otherwise distributing its resources").
6 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sc. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
67 Cf. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-55 (1984) (contrasting the ex ante and ex post legal perspectives).
68 See Varat, supra note 40, at 522-23 & n.150.
69 See Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 395-405.
7o See Varat, supra note 40, at 523 (citing Michelman, Property, Utility, and

Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204-05 (1967)).

1322

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:1309

of retaliation."
Thus, there are good reasons for the market participant exception
that do not rely on concepts of "traditional state function." Accordingly,
the exception should survive Garcia. Moreover, Garcia's holding (that
because states' role in national political processes suffices to protect
their authority, courts should not overrule Congress in the name of
state sovereignty) is fully reconcilable with a doctrine that limits court
intervention when Congress has not acted. In fact, the federal government's broad power to preempt state decisions"2 argues for granting
states more, not less, leeway to legislate in the first instance.
D.

The Contours of the Exception: Balancing Ends and Means
1.

The Permissibility of a Discriminatory End

The preceding discussion suggests that "market participation" is a
label for a type of proresident discrimination that serves a permissible
end. Thus, one test that should precede application of the market participant exception is whether the end sought by the state is permissible-whether the resource that the state seeks to keep is one that the
state in fact has a right to keep. The question is not whether the state
has a "regulatory" purpose; the line between "participant" and "regu-

lator" is notoriously difficult to draw.73 Many if not all state acts are
both participatory and regulatory. For example, a state may enter business in competition with private firms in order to regulate their behavior."4 The regulatory purpose of such acts should not disqualify them
from application of the "market participant" exception.
Whether the state has a right to keep a particular resource is ulti71 Cf Regan, supra note 22, at 1194 (arguing that one reason that discriminatory
state spending should be permitted under the dormant commerce clause, whereas discriminatory state regulation and taxation should not, is that the former is less coercive
than the latter, and therefore "less likely to produce resentment and retaliation").
72 As the Court held in Gould, market participant activity is subject to congressional preemption. See Gould, 475 U.S. at 286-91.
7 See generally Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do PubliclPrivate Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1445-48 (1982) (arguing that
"whatever lines [between public and private activities] may once have existed are closer
than ever to obliteration").
"' See, e.g., Adams, A Novel Scheme for Securing Railroad Competition, THE
NATION, Jan. 12, 1871, at 21-22 (proposing that Massachusetts purchase a fifty mile
length of railroad in an effort to regulate competition); see also T. MCCRAW,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 37 (1984) (praising Adams' plan as a seminal model for
effective regulation). The Tennessee Valley Authority is perhaps the best-known example of the Federal Government's use of this strategy. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 529-30 (1934) (noting that states or municipalities may enter business in
competition with private proprietors, and thus effectively, although indirectly, control
the prices the latter charge).
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mately a question of fairness, not simply a question of physical causation or of nominal ownership. 5 Whether the state deserves credit for
having actively created or sustained the good that it seeks to keep cannot be answered simply by reference to state property law, because the
state defines property rights. 6 Therefore, courts must turn to a more
philosophical analysis to test whether a state is unjustifiably defining
property into its own hands.71
When resources are wholly created by the state, almost any means
to keep them should be acceptable; the resource may be purposefully
and entirely denied to other states, at least absent congressional action.
When the resource's value was created entirely by nature or by the
nation as a whole, states may not try to hoard them;78 even the possessor state's power to pursue other legitimate goals, using means that
create some hoarding effect, is severely limited.7 9 But landfills are a
mixture.8 0 When the value is mixed, courts must examine the means
the state chooses to use. The question is: does the threat to national
political unity8 ' outweigh the participation-enhancing value of allowing
the state to pass the particular legislation (which depends on the degree
to which the state is entitled to the resource)? This is a balancing test,
75 Cf Casenote, ConstitutionalLaw, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1575, 1589-95
(1981)
'(attacking Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) for invoking an untenable, formalistic
distinction between participation and regulation, but ultimately conceding that since a
contrary result would have "den[ied] South Dakota the fruits of its labor ....
the
equities of the case seem to lie on the side of South Dakota, a fact which clearly played
a part in the decision").
78 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests..
are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law . . ").
11 See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948) (proposing that the theory
that states own raw natural resources within their borders is merely a legal fiction
expressing states' power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource).
78 See Regan, supra note 22, at 1110-43.
7
See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-29 (1978) (holding
that New Jersey could not hoard open lands even if its ultimate purpose in doing so
was to protect its citizens' health). The admittedly loose suggested inquiry into the
political process effect of protective state legislation is thus cabined by the threshold
question of whether the state is entitled to seek to protect a given resource.
80 See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
s The "threat to national unity" may generally be a function of the "burden on
interstate commerce," as that phrase has been fleshed out in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), and its progeny. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 44142 (1978); Hughes, 426 U.S. at 804; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 376 (1976).
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but not the standard Pike test for burdensome but "evenhanded" regulations that do not discriminate between states.8 2 Here, the state seeks
to discriminate, and the issue is what means the state may use to
achieve it.
2.

Finding the Appropriate Means

Even when the state's end is justifiable, not all means of discriminating are necessarily acceptable. Although courts and commentators
sometimes write as though the market participant exception would apply no matter what means the state used to pursue a "participatory"
goal-implying that the doctrine simply creates an exception for certain
ends with no means test 8 -courts have generally, and appropriately,
limited the exception to certain modes of state action.
The question of what modes are acceptable reached the Supreme
Court in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc.84 and in South-Central Timber Development, Inc., v. Wunnicke.8"
The apparent answer, for now, is that the line lies somewhere between
the facts of those two cases. In White, a 7-2 Court upheld a Boston
mayor's order that Boston residents be given half of all the jobs on cityfunded construction projects.86 The order included subcontractors that
were not in formal privity with the city. Nonetheless, the Court found
that such employees were "in a substantial if informal sense, 'working
for the city.' ",'Therefore, the city was acting as a market participant
in hiring them and might, if it chose, condition hiring on residency.
The Pike test is as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local

82

public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it

will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . [Tihe extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
83 See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that it is unduly formalistic to strike an Alaska statute aimed at
ensuring that private lumberers would hire Alaskans to process state-owned timber
solely because the means chosen by the state were unacceptable); Note, South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke: The Dormant Commerce Clause Fells
Alaska's PrimaryManufacture Requirementfor the Sale of State-Owned Timber, 5 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 155, 178 (1984) ("[T]he entire market-participant doctrine is suspect in

that it simply allows a state to defeat the goals of the commerce clause by adopting a
different governmental posture.").
8- 460
85 467
88
87

U.S. 204 (1983).
U.S. 82 (1984).
See White, 460 U.S. at 204.
See id. at 211 n.7.
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In Wunnicke, by contrast, the Court struck down a regulation
under which Alaska sold timber from state lands only to bidders who
would perform their initial lumber-processing within the state."' The
regulation's apparent purpose was to use Alaska's ownership of the
timberlands as leverage to ensure that Alaskans would be hired to process the lumber.8 9 Alaska's goal was the same as Boston's goal in White
attaching conditions to the transfer of state-owned resources in order to
create jobs. Yet four of the six Justices reaching the issue held that
Alaska was impermissibly seeking to impose "downstream regulation of
the timber-processing market in which it is not a participant." 90
There may be good reasons to draw the line between Boston's restriction of transactions, in which it directly supplied the entire
purchase price, and Alaska's restriction of a market in timber-processing, for which it indirectly supplied a proportionately minor input."1
But what these cases make clear is that the "participatory" character of
state action is not always obvious. The term is a label representing a
conclusion that the mode of state action at issue causes no more damage
to the policies of the commerce clause than the state is entitled to
inflict.92
Several reasons have been advanced to explain why a state puts
88 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 84 (striking down ALASKA
11, § 76.130 (1974) (repealed July 1982)). The regulation did not
in terms require local processing but rather required that the contract of sale include
such a condition. It may be significant, in considering the participation-enhancing value
of this law, that it was adopted by an agency rather than by the state legislature. The
presently governing statute states merely that the contract "terms shall include . . . the
sustained yield principle, subject to preference among beneficial uses," ALASKA STAT.
§ 38.05.115 (1984), and that "[tihe Commissioner may impose . . . terms considered
necessary and proper to protect the interests of the state." Id. § 38.05.120.
89 The alternative was processing in Japan, which buys 90% of Alaska's timber,
not in other states. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 85-86 n.4. But
the Court strongly implied that it would have reached the same result had the market
been a purely domestic one with the alternative being processing in another state. See
id. at 100.

ADMIN. CODE, tit.

90

See id. at 99.

The state supplied the raw material (lumber) but not the labor or the capital by
which it was processed. Nor had the state tended the trees; they had simply grown on
its land.
92 Some commentators have criticized the apparent "anomaly" that state attempts
to create trade barriers are per se invalid if the state is acting as a "regulator," but are
per se valid if the state is acting as a "participant." See, e.g., Blumoff, supra note 45,
at 83-112 (viewing the proprietary exception as an anachronistic product of economic
necessity as perceived by state courts in the nineteenth century); Note, Home-State
Preferences in Public Contracting:A Study in Economic Balkanization, 58 IOWA L.
REV. 576, 583 (1973) (concluding that the "essential validity of the [proprietary/governmental dichotomy] is open to serious question"). But it is precisely the difference in
the means employed that calls for different treatment by the courts. See infra notes
104-09 and accompanying text.
91
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less strain on the commerce clause when it acts as a buyer or seller than
as a regulator. One argument, based on original intent, is that although
the Constitution was drafted with the goal of ending economic balkanization among the states,93 the commerce clause is "principally" aimed
at private trade, leaving "[s]tates themselves to operate freely in the free
market.194 There is no evidence, however, that in drafting the com-

merce clause, the Framers even considered state proprietary activity. 95
Moreover, federal regulation of interstate trade has expanded beyond
any scope the Framers are likely to have contemplated;9 6 consequently,
the Framers' thoughts regardiihg the limits of state action in the absence
of federal regulation should be of limited relevance today.
Perhaps the most frequently offered rationale for treating proprietary activity differently is that when states are acting like private businesses, "evenhandedness" demands that states be treated like private
businesses: They should be subject to federal regulation, but otherwise
free to discriminate on the basis of state lines.9" This rationale makes
sense as an argument for allowing state proprietary decisions to reflect
the same considerations of price, quality, and even convenience of location that motivate private businesspeople. 9 One could even argue that
these factors will so dominate state proprietary decisions that judicial
review is unwarranted.9 9 That point, however, is empirically and theoretically debatable.1 00 In any case, the rationale does not serve as a
" See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)
(noting Framers' intent to federalize interstate commerce); Eule, supra note 31, at 43031 (discussing especially Madison's intent); Stern, supra note 22, at 1337-38 (stating
that Framers determined "that the adequate protection of commerce required a complete revision of the structure of government"). But see Regan, supra note 22, at 1114
n.55 (noting that Framers may have been more concerned with state restrictions on
international than on interstate trade).
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980).
" See L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-11 at 432; Varat, supra note 40, at 505.
9 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
9 See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 65, at 1123; see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at
439 ("[Sitate proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when
acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.").
9 See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 65, at 1129-30 (acknowledging that "government no doubt has interests that it shares with private enterprise when it enters the
market" but cautioning that the market participant exception "should not be permitted
under the guise of protecting these interests, to function as a mechanism for according
special consideration to the political interests that the government ordinarily pursues").
" Cf American Yearbook Co., 339 F. Supp. at 725 (judicial review "would unduly interfere with state proprietary functions if not bring them to a standstill"); Recent Cases, ConstitutionalLaw, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360-61 (1967) (discussing
implications of abandoning the presumption of validity with respect to state proprietary
actions).
"I See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A State frequently will
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ground for allowing discrimination so long as it is accomplished by acceptable means, but rather, as a reminder that apparent discrimination
may have a nondiscriminatory explanation."0 ' As an argument for allowing states to transact preferentially with their own residents simply
because of their residency, however, this reasoning by analogy has
properly been criticized as begging the question.'0 2 "The very act in
question-favoritism of in-state residents without regard to profit-is
one that belies reliance on concepts of private property; it is a public
act. "103
A better argument is that courts should not intervene precisely because the state is deliberately choosing an "unprofitable" course in restricting its dealings to state residents even though nonresidents may
offer better bargains. If the state chooses to subsidize residents by buying from them at inflated prices or by selling them its products at a
discount, it merely accomplishes a redistribution that is within its legitimate goals and that (at least theoretically) it could have achieved by
other means. Direct grants from the state to some of its residents, even
subsidies that help its residents compete in interstate commerce, are not
seen as threatening the cohesion of the union;0 4 it is not clear why
indirect subsidies would pose any greater danger.' 05 Moreover, the fact
respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic concerns.").
But see generally Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956) (theorizing that an inverse correlation of capital and taxpayer mobility with
jurisdictional size makes local and state governments act more like private businesses
than does national government).
101 Thus, this argument seeks to establish states' proprietary conduct as constitutionally permissible under the branch of Pike that upholds nonprotectionist measures
marginally burdening interstate commerce in pursuit of legitimate ends. See supra note
82.
'02See Varat, supra note 40, at 506-07 ("The evenhandedness rationale. . . begs
the question. Why is it important to allow state business to be conducted with the same
freedom as private business?").
103 Id. at 506.
104 Cf New Energy Co., 108 S. Ct. at 1809-10 (minimal scrutiny given to Indiana
ethanol cash subsidy).
'0 Granted, the state's citizens will be less able to monitor hidden than explicit

subsidies. Cf K. SHEPSLE & B. WEINGAST,

FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY IN THE

1980s

343-67 (discussing how Congress uses hidden subsidies to provide constituents with
benefits without alienating nonrecipients, resulting in inefficient spending). But the
possibility of obtaining such subsidies, and the need for close involvement in order to
prevent them from going to others, is likely to promote participation in state politics,
and thus in politics generally. Therefore, the availability of hidden subsidies on the
state level may create competition for entrenched national interest groups, arguably
strengthening the national political process. Cf Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 387-88
(hypothesizing that in a situation in which some union employees have concerns that
are not being addressed by the union on a national level, the employees could organize
on the local level, influence state legislation, and eventually make their presence felt on
the national level, providing some competition for the entrenched union).
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that such policies impose fiscal burdens on states is likely to limit their
use and to dampen any cycle of retaliation. l08 Even without court intervention, state elections and the threat of taxpayer exodus serve as
checks.
Such proprietary decisions are also less "coercive" than regulations
prohibiting transactions between two private parties.' 0 7 Because they do
not drastically alter the legal status quo, they strike most people as
more reasonable, and are less likely to create a cycle of retaliation.'0 "
Furthermore, they are not likely to prevent nonresidents from finding
alternate suppliers or customers.'
"Evenhandedness" toward state proprietary activity has another
meaning: the commerce clause should push states neither toward nor
away from expanding their public sectors. Professor Varat is concerned
that the participant exception may create an incentive to enlarge the
public sector." 0 While he may well be correct that the Constitution
should be neutral in this regard, the participant exception clears the
way to socialism, or rather to state capitalism, only insofar as it enhances the power of states acting as sellers. In the state purchasing
context, however, the exception enables states to privatize traditional
state functions without simultaneously loosing the ripple effects that
flow from their performance."' Without the exception, states would
lose flexibility in reshaping their governments to meet changing needs.
II.

THE LABOR-VALUE THEORY APPLIED TO NATURAL
RESOURCES

The labor-value theory discussed above was hardened into doctrine
by Reeves, Inc. v. Stake." 2 In Reeves, the Court held that South Dakota was entitled to keep cement produced by a state-owned factory
because
[c]ement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild
game, or minerals. It is the end product of a complex process
10' See Regan, supra note 22, at 1194 (noting that the "very fact that spending
programs involve spending . . . makes them less likely to proliferate than measures like
tariffs").
107 See id.

108 See id.
109 See id. at 1195.

.10See Varat, supra note 40, at 530 n.175 (concluding that such a bias is tolerable
because the Constitution contemplates state freedom to choose public sectors of various
sizes and because other features of our society will preclude rampant socialism).
.. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd
mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
11 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw
materials. South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the
13
State's limestone or other materials used to make cement.1
The term "natural resource" connotes at least two meanings. It
can mean either a good produced by nature with minimal social investment, or a tangible good physically similar to items in the first category
but requiring significant investment, either to produce it or to make it
available for consumption. A tree growing in virgin forest belongs to
the first category, what this Comment will call "raw" natural resources. A tree grown in Brooklyn, however, was probably tended by
someone.
Before the turn of the century, the Supreme Court adhered to the
common law rule that raw natural resources such as wild game be4
longed to the state as trustee for present and future inhabitants.1
With the growth of an integrated and industrial national economy, this
rule came to be seen as anachronistic. Protectionist laws transferred
control over the alienability of resources from entrepreneurs who had
invested, or wished to invest in their exploitation, to states that were by
mere fortuity located on resource-rich land. Thus, the Court held in a
series of cases in the early 1900s that a state may not "giv[e] a preference to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its [merely] natural advantages.""1 5 The lone fact that the Paleozoic era deposited more coal
under Pennsylvania than under New Jersey gives Pennsylvanians no
greater claim to such coal's use." 6 This conception of natural resources
continues in force. Recent decisions striking down protectionist laws
based on the mere fact that a state declares "ownership" over wild
Id. at 443-44 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (noting that the
"'ownership of wild animals ... is in the State ... in its sovereign capacity as the
representative and for the benefit of all its people in common'" (quoting State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 400, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (1894)); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391, 394 (1876) (explaining that each state owns the tidewaters within its jurisdiction
and the fish they contain).
11 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 602 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's holding); see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403,
406 (1948) (finding unconstitutional a South Carolina statute requiring out-of-state
shrimp boats operating in South Carolina waters to pay higher licensing fees and to
process their catch in South Carolina); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 1, 13 (1928) (invalidating a similar Louisiana law); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 595-600 (striking down West Virginia's attempt to give preference
to domestic consumers of natural gas over out-of-state users); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911) (finding unconstitutional an Oklahoma law prohibiting foreign corporations from transporting natural gas out of the state).
"1
Cf West, 221 U.S. at 255 (arguing that were the Court to uphold the statute
in question, then "Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals").
111

114
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game or raw natural resources found within its borders, fit comfortably
within the conception's rationale."'
Some "natural" resources, however, exist only because significant
efforts have been invested in sustaining and preserving them. In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,"' for example, the Court upheld a
state law that discriminated against nonresidents in granting permits to
hunt elk after recognizing that "wild" elk still roamed Montana largely
because the state had invested in their preservation by employing rangers and regulating hunting." 9
This distinction is growing in importance, because, as the American frontier continues to close, the natural resources that remain increasingly owe their existence to some form of human investment. The
Constitution should perhaps contain a positive bias toward protection of
future generations in order to ensure the longevity of the union.'2 In
any case, the Constitution should not push states away from investing
117 See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982)
(invalidating Nebraska's attempt to restrict ground water exportation by requiring reciprocity with the exporting state); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331, 333-40 (1982) (invalidating New Hampshire's attempt to restrict use of energy generated by the Connecticut river because New Hampshire "owned" the river);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (invalidating Oklahoma's attempt to
restrict minnow exports, and thereby overruling Geer).
11s 436 U.S. 371 (1978). Baldwin was a privileges and immunities clause, see
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.
1, rather than a commerce clause case. However, the
doctrine appears to have force in the commerce clause area as well. See Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-29 (1981); see also Hellerstein, Hughes v.
Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 S.CT. REv. 51, 89 (noting that the Virginia oyster beds at issue in
McCready "should be treated differently from unowned resources . . . . If the States
[sic] had expended large sums of money to develop, manage, and cultivate oyster beds
located in state waters, one might regard the entire enterprise as a 'statewide oyster
"farm' subsidized by the State, to which access might reasonably be limited" (footnote
omitted)).
This Comment does not directly address the implications of privileges and immunities clause doctrine for state attempts to preserve natural resources, primarily for the
sake of simplicity and also because challenges to such state laws typically are launched
by corporations. Under longstanding precedents, "corporate entit[ies] . . . cannot claim
the protection of article IV's privileges and immunities clause." L. TRIBE, supra note
23, § 6-2 n.3.
19 See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 375-76. It seems to be irrelevant for commerce
clause analysis whether the resource at issue is wanted for hunting or for some other
more "essential" use. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 614-29 (upholding
Montana's severance tax on coal against dormant commerce clause attack, despite the
national importance of that resource). But see Pennsylvaniav. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
at 601 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the natural gas the state sought to
preserve was more important than the damaged citrus fruits subject to state regulation
sustained in Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915)).
120 More tenuously, it could also be argued that future generations deserve protection in today's decisions as a "discrete and insular" interest group. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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in preserving their natural resources and toward investing in their exploitation. Yet this perverse incentive is precisely the result if the
Reeves holding (that states may retain the benefits of exploiting their
natural resources) stands, while states are barred from reaping the benefits of their conservation efforts.
In Baldwin, the state investment in elk preservation took the form
of monetary outlays.1 2' The monetary nature of the investment is not
central to the investment-value rationale; a state whose citizens each
devoted one day per year to elk conservation work would be at least as
entitled as those of Montana (who paid through taxes) to localize elk
use.

1 22

A much harder question would be posed by a state claiming that
its past frugality in forestalling exploitation is responsible for a resource's current availability.' 23 Applied indiscriminately, such a
"thrift" exception would swallow the rule limiting protectionism to
state-created goods. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, for example, Nebraska,
although it was not responsible for the rain, had encouraged water conservation and was thus partly responsible for the level of the aquifer. 24
On the other hand, the same notions of equity and encouragement of
investment that underlie the general labor-value rule argue for allowing
states to reap the benefit of their past thrift. One solution to this dilemma is to apply the "thrift" exception only when the state, in order
to encourage conservation, has purposefully encouraged or coerced its
residents into changing their practices from some preexisting or national norm.

III.
A.

APPLICATION TO SOLID WASTE

Disposal Capacity as a State-Created Resource

In a two-word parenthetical, the Reeves Court implicitly contrasted the export of work product with what it had characterized as
the effective export of undeveloped open space in Philadelphiav. New
121

See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 389.

It has been argued that the restraint necessitated by direct fiscal outlays is an
important safeguard limiting the market participant exception. See Regan, supra note
22, at 1194-95. Citizens' resistance to changing their lifestyle to meet state needs, however, is an equivalent, if not much stronger, restraint.
123 This is a question on which Regan explicitly reserves judgment. See id. at
1203 (speculating that a state's residents "may be entitled to benefit specially from a
state policy of general nondevelopment that they specially bear the opportunity costs
122

of").

124 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (invalidating Nebraska's attempt to restrict ground water exportation by requiring reciprocity with the exporting state); id. at 955.
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Jersey.125 The Court had no cause then to rethink the nature of the
disposal market. But today, far more than in 1978, when a state accepts
garbage and effectively exports the right to use landfill space, it exports
much more than the raw undeveloped natural resource value of the
land. If the state pays for the operation of a disposal facility, it also
exports services, including compliance with increasingly stringent environmental regulations.1 2 Although the value of those services may be
most apparent where the disposal is by capital-intensive incineration, 27
it is also substantial when disposal is by the far more common method
of landfilling.' 28
Further, regardless of who operates the disposal facility, it is the
residents of the receiving state who bear the social costs of waste acceptance. These costs include the necessity of increased recycling efforts by
local businesses and residents;129 health risks and environmental degradation; 30 and eventually a divisive and expensive siting procedure for
"I Compare Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 (1980) (characterizing
"landfill sites" as natural resources) with Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
628 (1978) (finding it a "difference . . . without consequence" that the scarce natural
resource at issue, the state's remaining landfill space and open lands, did not physically
move as an article of commerce).
126 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
127 See Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation
or Confitsion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 334 (1982) (noting that a "sophisticated
hazardous waste facility, such as an incinerator" is particularly likely to pass the
Reeves "costly physical plant" test).
28 See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211-12 (D.R.I. 1987)
(disposing of the Reeves Court's parenthetical reference to Philadelphiav. New Jersey
by defining the relevant market as the market for landfill services, rather than landfill
sites); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 216, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984) (characterizing market as landfill services rather than sites).
12 The leading legislative proposals to increase recycling are expensive; they are
economical only because their costs are offset by disposal cost savings. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T. OF ENVIRONMENTAL

RESOURCEs, BUREAU OF WASTE MANAGE-

MENT, CURBSIDE RECYCLING IN PENNSYLVANIA 2 (1985) (estimating curbside re-

cycling collection costs at $23.18 per ton, $4.69 per ton more than the resale value of
the materials collected, but $8.28 per ton less than the direct cost of disposal); Memo
from Charles Greenwalt, Director, Policy Development and Research Office, to Senator Michael Fisher, Chairman, Pennsylvania Senate Environmental Resources and Energy Committee, on Costs and Benefits of Bottle Bill Legislation 66-67 (Jan. 29, 1987)
(estimating yearly costs of handling returnable beverage containers at $201.2 million)
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
12. See 1 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED
STATES 16-34 (1988) (reviewing the significant adverse environmental effects of munic-

ipal solid waste landfills); id. at 17-19 (finding "little difference in the location, design,
and operation of newer municipal solid waste landfills versus older landfills"); id. at
34-40 (reviewing the scanty data on environmental impacts of Industrial Subtitle D
facilities, such as industrial landfills and mining waste piles, and finding "cause for
concern"); see also Brief for Appellee at 37-40, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978) (No. 77-404) (arguing that landfills necessarily damage aesthetic and envi-
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additional waste disposal facilities.13 1 The garbage-receiving state essentially exports a third benefit by enabling its neighbor to avoid those
costs. It can do so because its residents have worked and will continue
to work as a polity to reduce waste production, save open space for
landfilling, absorb and mitigate the health and environmental costs of
waste acceptance, and make a hard choice on siting.
A state never "owns" this ability in the same way that it can own
legal title to the piece of land being polluted. But if a state's declaration
that it owns a resource does not prove that it has earned it,.. 2 the converse should also be true: That a resource is too intangible for a state to
"own" does not prove that the state did not work to create it. 3'
B.

ConsiderationsArguing For Upholding State Laws

The solid waste context illustrates the need for allowing states to
capture the benefits of their investments. Suppose a state (call it Sylvania) can neither prevent its neighbor Urbana from using its landfills,
nor recover compensation for the social costs it thereby incurs. Suppose
further that the inverse is also true. Urbana will be dissuaded from
working to reduce its waste production, because much of the benefit of
this reduction would flow to Sylvania. Urbana will not want to build
its disposal capacity for the same reason. Sylvania will soon be faced
with the need to either increase its disposal facilities or reduce its waste
production. But it will probably do neither. Instead, it will send more
waste out of state, to Urbana or anywhere else disposal capacity remains. The result of this cycle is under-investment in waste reduction
or facility siting, or as is most likely in this politically-charged context,
13 4
under-investment in both.
Beyond this threshold labor-value argument, additional reasons
ronmental values because even if new technologies to prevent groundwater leaching
prove successful in the long run, all landfills produce dangerous gases); Shabecoff,
Ashes of Garbageare Found Toxic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1987, at A2, col. 1 (reporting EPA findings that ash from garbage incineration contains significant levels of toxic

metals); Shabecoff, Tighter U.S. Rules Proposedfor Municipal Incinerators, N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1987, at A16, col. 1 (citing an EPA study demonstrating that pollution
from garbage incinerators can cause cancer and other illnesses).
'3' See Glaberson, Coping in the Age of "Nimby," N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, at
C1, col. 2 (describing residents' opposition to attempts to locate waste disposal sites in
their communities).
132 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133 Cf. infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing statement in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981), that a state may impose
excise taxes for the service of providing "the advantages of a civilized society").
134 Cf. Florini, supra note 127, at 324-27 (providing a fuller discussion of this
"reverse commons problem" in the context of hazardous wastes).
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counsel loose judicial regulation of states' responses to the solid waste
crisis. As discussed above, courts facing a dormant commerce clause issue should emulate a hypothetical congress preoccupied with preserving
a dynamically functioning federalist system. 3 ' There are a number of
reasons such a congress would give states a loose rein in dealing with
solid waste.
First, localizing solid waste policy decisions will promote popular
participation in their making." 6 It may be that people participate more
in smaller political units in which they have greater proportionate influence; 37 the proposition certainly seems to apply to issues of waste
disposal. Thousands of local and statewide organizations have sprung
up over the past two decades, for example, to protest disposal facilities.
While often derided as based on mere "nimby" (not in my backyard)
thinking, such participation has value. Without broad public participation, the political process will be skewed toward protection of large
waste producers and handlers, who have a larger stake in the outcome.
Thus, broad political participation can lead to decisions more in line
with the interests, not only of the state's citizenry, but of the nation." 8
Moreover, local participation is vital to legitimizing the decision.
Legitimacy in turn is vital to the success of source reduction measures,
which may require some lifestyle changes. It will also lower the transaction costs of facility siting. The opportunity to participate also has its
own intrinsic value in that it upholds the dignity of citizens. Indeed,
local participation may protect that value better than participation restricted to national politics.
Second, waste disposal and processing is an area in which experimentation by the states is devoutly to be wished." 9 Recycling, in partic-

138

See supra text accompanying notes 22-41.
See Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 395-408.

137

See

135

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN

PARTICIPATION

IN THE AMERICAN

FEDERAL SYSTEM 91-96 (1979) (finding that

while substantial citizen participation occurs at every level of American government,
the frequency and breadth of participation is higher at more local levels).
138

See Ethridge, Proceduresfor Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy:

An Assessment of Policy Effects, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION
MAKING 115, 128-30 (J. DeSario & S. Langton eds. 1987) (concluding that opening
the federal bureaucracy to participation simply "create[s] somewhat better access for
interests already influential"; only "broad-based mobilization" will "create genuine
public influence").
"' See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932); see also

Reeves,.Inc., 447 U.S. at 441 (noting that wielding the dormant commerce clause sparingly fosters "effective and creative programs for solving local problems"); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 816 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the commerce clause should not "inhibit a state's power to experiment with different methods
of encouraging local industry"). But cf. Note, The Disposition of State-Owned Resources Under the Commerce Clause, 21 Hous. L. REV. 533, 545 n.92 (interpreting
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ular, involves invention and the development of new institutions.1 40
Much of the apparent economic efficiency of a national free-trade-zone
policy comes from shifting waste disposal from regions with diminished
capacity to regions with greater capacity. While at any given moment
this will be the most macro-efficient disposal pattern, it will tend to
result in postponing the "garbage crisis" until it is encountered nationwide. The costs of learning how to deal with disposal problems will
then be much larger and will be felt nationwide instead of being confined to a few states. Moreover, because measures such as household
separation of recyclables from trash and packaging reform may require
significant alterations of lifestyle, legislatures and Congress will be very
reluctant to pass such measures if their efficacy has not been proven in
practice. There are reasons to desire and expect eventual federal regulation, but it will be more effective if based on states' experience.
Third, the costs incurred when a state accepts waste fall unevenly
throughout the state and are valued differently by different people.
Whatever decision the state makes, including the decision not to sell
disposal capacity to nonresidents at any price, the state unavoidably offends some of its residents. If only because such strain and disaffection
within the state create problems for national political unity as well, the
state should be free to seek accommodation of its residents' divergent
interests. 1 And because any decision is likely to have redistributive
effects, including intergenerational redistribution, the state is in a better
position to make these decisions than is the federal government.
A fourth possible reason is more problematic. Our hypothetical
congress might be tempted to minimize political strain by allowing protectionist barriers simply because many citizens feel differently about
bearing the social costs of waste when it comes from outside the political community. 42 This feeling may go beyond a reasonable desire for
these quotations as suggesting that "[t]he Supreme Court seems inclined to give the
states wider latitude when state actions are of local rather than national importance").
140 Federal legislative and executive officers may be in a better position to benefit
from successful innovations and hence may be less risk-averse than state and local officials. See Rapaczynski, supra note 35, at 408-414; Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614-16
(1980). That possibility argues for allowing the federal government full preemption
power. It does not, however, argue for limiting what innovation state and local officials
do undertake in the face of federal silence.
141 The Carolene Products argument that the courts must protect the interests of
nonresidents, see supra notes 73-111 and accompanying text, loses what force it may
have when a block of residents adequately represents nonresident interests.
142 See D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES:
LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 74 (1982) (reporting a Duke

University poll of North Carolina residents: "[Only 7 percent of the respondents said
they approved of allowing wastes generated out of state to be disposed of in their
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fair compensation and become parochialism. There is a difference between states taking into account fiscal effects, such as increased siting
costs, that result from such parochialism, and counting injured parochial sentiments themselves as a cost.143 While the actual Congress is
free to do so,"" courts acting as a hypothetical congress should hesitate
to give the latter legal voice.
C.

Ways to Keep Disposal Capacity

States can take many steps to reduce their waste production, and
thereby (unless other states rush into the vacuum) save disposal capacity, without raising significant constitutional issues.' 4 5 The dormant
commerce clause should also allow states to reserve disposal rights to
their own citizens using means commensurate to the degree that the
value of those rights was created by the efforts of the state and the
forbearance of its citizens.' Allowing protectionist barriers is one solution to the problem of externalized social costs. But it must be noted
that it is not the only solution. Protectionist barriers have monetary and
environmental costs of their own.' 4 7 In any case, the availability of alcounty. About 38 percent said they would be willing to allow wastes from within the
state, and 49 percent said they would only accept wastes from within their county.");
Sandman, Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting Hazardous
Waste Facilities, 9 SETON HALL LEG. J. 437, 454-55 (1985) (discussing same poll). It
is reasonable to assume that many citizens hold similar preferences against imported
solid waste. Cf Barden, Garbageis One Thing, but Garbagefrom New York? Forget
It, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, at A26, col. 2 (reporting that constituents' adverse reaction to the prospect of garbage importation, particularly from AIDS-plagued New
York, forced officials of Benton, Ark., to reject a lucrative waste-acceptance contract).
143 Cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (upholding city's decision
to close its municipal swimming pools after they had been ordered desegregated on the
ground that the city had reasonably concluded that the pools "could not be operated
safely and economically on an integrated basis").
"" See supra note 10 (noting that Congress in its treatment of low-level radioactive waste disposal implicitly recognized parochial sentiments).
145 The most widely-discussed measures are curbside separation and container deposit legislation to promote recycling, see supra note 129 and accompanying text, and
packaging reform to limit discards, see, e.g, Lai & Selke, The Role of Packagingin the
Trash Crisis, 1V.I.E.W. PRoc. 151 (1988). Such exercises of the states' police powers
do not discriminate against nonresidents; therefore, under the standard Pike test, see
supra note 82 and accompanying text, they are presumptively legitimate. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981) (upholding a ban on the
sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable containers); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor
Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 627-47, 517 P.2d 691, 696-705 (1973) (upholding
container deposit law).
146 Hellerstein, supra note 118, at 91, implies that the technique used for holding
onto resources should be proportionate to the degree of ownership, on some kind of
sliding scale.
147 For example, some states may as a matter of geography have few environmentally sound disposal sites. All else being equal, it is environmentally preferable for such
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ternate means must be considered; because the market participant exception includes a means test, the availability of alternate means may
argue against applying it.
Absent federal regulation, states seeking to keep state-created disposal capacity have at least five alternatives. First, they may in some
circumstances completely blockade exogenous waste. Second, they may
follow Rhode Island's example, and manage all disposal operations
themselves, while refusing to admit exogenous waste into state-operated
facilities. Third, they may charge for the disposal of waste within their
borders, by raising tipping fees at state-run facilities and by taxing private landfill operators. Fourth, they may refuse waste from states with
weaker recycling programs. And fifth, they may allow or require each
county in the state to refuse out-of-county waste. The limits of these
alternatives demand further exploration. So, briefly, does a sixth possibility: federal regulation.
The aim of this brief survey is not to provide conclusive answers
concerning the constitutionality of these various arrangements. The discussion above has sought to advance a general perspective on the dormant commerce clause, not a fully developed theory capable of such
application. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the types of questions that
the process-enhancing perspective may soon be called upon to frame,
and to hazard some very preliminary responses.
1. A Complete Ban on All Solid Waste Importation
a. State-Owned Facilities
When the state not only absorbs the social costs of a landfill but
also owns the land and operates the landfill, it should be allowed to
withhold landfill space entirely from residents of other states.14 s As argued above, the labor-value theory alone is enough to justify states in
states to export their waste. Furthermore, it would be less costly to divide waste management districts by metropolitan "wasteshed" regions than by state line. See Comment,
State Embargo of Solid Waste: Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution to a
Pressing Problem?, 82 DICK. L. REv. 325, 330 & n.29 (1978). It was for the latter
reason that the EPA intervened as amicus curiae and sided with the appellants in
Philadelphiav. New Jersey. See Lecture by Joseph Manko, former General Counsel to
EPA Region III (Feb. 8 1989); see also Jurisdictional Statement at A102-A105, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
148 See Comment, State Immunity from Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of
the Market-ParticipantDoctrinefrom State Purchase and Sale of Goods and Services
to Natural Resources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 515, 545 (1985) (arguing that "the state
has little difficulty in establishing ownership if the natural resource is on state public
lands and subject to state extraction").
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refusing nonresidents access to state-owned disposal facilities.' 4 9
But what if the state runs every facility within its territory? This
question was before the courts in Stevens, Shayne Bros., and
Lefrancois, but those courts were able to avoid the inquiry by noting
the availability of procedures for the licencing of new, private landfills.'

50

Suppose, however, that a state either repealed its licencing pro-

visions, or its past practice demonstrated its unwillingness to licence
private facilities. Should there be a "monopoly exception" to the market
participant exception? Absent an emergency, no. The blockading state
has no monopoly on the inputs necessary to create disposal capacity
elsewhere. Other states may obtain those inputs and dispose of their
own wastes. 5 ' When the state seeking to export waste has neither time
nor alternatives, however, the immediate threat to the public health
1 52
might entitle it to an injunction.

b.

Private Facilities

The "market participant" exception may sometimes justify withholding private landfill space as well. If the social costs of waste disposal are sufficiently large, the citizens' input in accepting them may
completely overshadow the land and service inputs of even a private
landfill owner.
When Philadelphiav. New Jersey was decided, this factual condition was probably not met. It may or may not be today. If population
density and the demand for environmental quality both continue to rise,
however, it will certainly be met at some future point. Even if the la149 Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987) provides a particularly strong precedent for this proposition. A milder means of keeping landfill capacity was already in place before the state banned importation, yet the ban was upheld. See supra note 20.
150 See Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1210-12; Shaye Bros., Inc. v. District of Co-

lumbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299

Md. 203, 214, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984). The issue might have been present but the
plaintiffs appear not to have raised it in Kavanagh v. London Grove, 33 Pa. Commw.
420, 422-23, 382 A.2d 148, 149-50 (1978), affd by an equally divided court, 486 Pa.
133, 404 A.2d 393 (1979) (upholding a zoning ordinance barring privately owned

landfills against a constitutional attack apparently based solely on the fifth and fourteenth amendments).
151 See Varat, supra note 40, at 539 (arguing that a state with monopoly power
over a resource has an equity obligation to share it with nonresidents, but that this
obligation may disappear if the resource could be duplicated in the other state).
152 Kavanagh, 486 Pa. at 135, 404 A.2d at 394 (Roberts, J., voting to affirm),
suggests that municipalities might be allowed to zone for only publicly-owned facilities
because these facilities are more likely to prevent environmental damage and to remain
available to pay for closure. While the first distinction can be argued, the second will
likely be obviated by proposed federal regulations. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.

RECYCLING PHILADELPHIA

1989]

bor-value argument alone fails fully to justify a total blockade, the
value of state variation, participation, and adjustment of local interests
might tip the balance in its favor. When continued waste importation
will create a critical near-term shortage of disposal capacity and
thereby threaten public health while new capacity is sought or built, of
153
course, states' powers are even greater.
2.

Monetary Compensation

If Sylvania charged a fee for the disposal of waste within its borders greater than the land and service costs of disposal, it would induce
its Urbanian neighbors to dispose of their own garbage and reduce
their waste production."" Such state efforts to obtain monetary compensation for receiving waste are constitutionally permissible, and states
are beginning to use them. 5 If we are willing to accept that the values
destroyed by solid waste may be given a dollar price, such a fee could
fully compensate Sylvania for the loss of those values. Further, the
monies received could be targeted to those most affected by the disposal
facility. Higher disposal costs, however, make illegal dumping more
57
likely.' 56 Collecting them also involves administrative costs.1

153 See Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd., 100 N.J. 134, 149, 495
A.2d 49, 57, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); see also Comment, Trial Court Order

Barring the City of Philadelphiafrom Dumping Solid Waste at Kinsley Landfill is
not an UnconstitutionalBurden On Interstate Commerce, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 37379 (1986).
154

See generally Garbage and the Commerce Clause: New Approaches for an

Effluent Society, 106 N.J.L.J., Oct. 30, 1980, at 4, 4 (editorial) (suggesting that New
Jersey raise landfill fees to reduce waste importation).
"I See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IE-28(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1988) (imposing
tipping fees starting at $1.50 per ton of solid waste in 1985, now $4.65); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-19-13(g) (1986) (imposing fees of $8 per ton in 1986, increasing to $13 in
1990 and at a rate of 7.5% annually thereafter); 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 414, 432 (Purdon) (to be codified at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4000.701(a), 4000.1310(b) (Purdon)) (imposing recycling and host municipality benefit fees totaling $3.00 per ton of
solid waste); see also sources cited supra note 6 (surveying state responses to the solid
waste crisis); infra note 205 and accompanying text (noting that New Jersey imposes a
tax on the importation of solid waste into a county solid waste management district).
'

See, e.g., Hanley, Hauling Costs Soaring,Jerseyans Turn to Dumping Trash

Illegally, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (reporting that illegal dumping in
New Jersey is on the rise along with tipping fees). See generally Calabresi & Me-

lamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1110 (1972) (arguing that enforcement costs may make a
theoretically efficient rule inefficient in practice).
151 For those states with caps on the absolute size of their budget, spending more
state money on waste regulation and facility siting, means that the state has to limit
other services even if it earns revenue for its efforts. This argument is less compelling,
however, given that the state can always increase its budget ceiling.
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a. Raised Fees at State-Owned Facilities
Increased tipping fees at state-owned facilities should raise few
questions. If state ownership confers the right to refuse altogether to
accept exogenous waste,' 58 then surely the state has the lesser power to
set any price the market will bear. In other words, state-owned disposal
capacity is protected by a property rule under which the state legislature can decide whether to transfer it and on what terms,' 59 rather than
by a liability rule under which nonresidents may purchase it at a judicially-determined price.' 6 ° That states acting as market participants
hold their wares under a property rule is precisely what the Court held
in Reeves, Inc., v. Stake.''
Even if the state charges nonresident waste producers more than it
charges residents, nonresidents are either paying more than the total
costs to the state and its residents of accepting their waste, or they are
not. If the latter, the state's taxpayers are subsidizing waste disposal
and may legitimately reserve most of that subsidy to residents.' 62 If the
former, the state is subject to competition from other sources of disposal
capacity. 63 If it does not lower its price, it is choosing to forgo a profitable transfer for the benefit of its future inhabitants-a decision unlikely to harm the political fabric of the union, particularly because the
present taxpayers' and voters' self-interest lines up with that of
nonresidents.
b. Nondiscriminatory Excise Taxes on Private Operators
Excise taxes on private landfill operators should also be allowed.
Under the four-part test established in Complete Auto Transit, the
court will "sustain[] a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when
the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
"I See Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1212 (holding that a state acting as a participant in the landfill services market may refuse to sell disposal capacity to nonresidents).
This property rule is subject, however, to congressional limitation. See infra
notes 212-24 and accompanying text.
180 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 156, at 1106-10 (analyzing
the difference between property rules and liability rules).
16- 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980).
1.2 While its litigation strategy precluded making this argument, New Jersey
seems to have subsidized waste disposal in the years before Philadelphiav. New Jersey.
See Note, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal:New Jersey's Options
After the Philadelphia Decision, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 31, 38 & nn.66-68 (1979) (noting
that political pressure from New Jersey municipalities had kept disposal costs in New
Jersey artificially low when compared to New York and Pennsylvania).
163 This competition is increasing as the costs of disposal rise relative to the costs
of transportation. See sources cited supra note 5.
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commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State. 164
Waste disposal provides a more than substantial nexus with the receiving state; 6 5 a fair apportionment issue is unlikely;168 and by hypothesis, the excise tax considered here applies to all waste deposited at the
landfill on a nondiscriminatory per-ton or other basis.18 7 The requirement that taxation bear a "fair relation" to services provided by the
state, however, is somewhat more problematic.
A narrow construction of "services" might limit taxation to such
direct costs as the marginal increase in the state environmental agency's
budget necessitated by the need to regulate a larger volume of waste.1 6
Under Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,1 69 however, "services"
is defined very broadly. The state may demand compensation for indirect services such as its ongoing efforts to provide "police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and 'the advantages of a
civilized society.' "170 Had the state not provided these services yesterday, the taxed commerce would be impossible today; without continuing efforts, it would become impossible tomorrow. This rubric is broad
enough to encompass the costs1 7 1 of siting disposal facilities, developing
recycling programs, and mitigating health and aesthetic problems occasioned by waste acceptance.1 2 Whether the tax may also reflect costs
borne by citizens uncompensated by the state treasury, such as the costs
of complying with recycling laws, presents difficult theoretical issues.
Practically, however, courts will grant the state such great deference in
assessing the value of the services it provides that the state may charge
as much as it wants.17 The reasons for deference cited by the Coma-, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
165 When the disposal is by landfilling, the nexus is physical.
166 A fair apportionment issue conceivably could arise if a producer claimed she
had already paid her own state for costs associated with the anticipated but unrealized
landfilling of the wastes in that state.
167 See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
168 Cf Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620 n.10 (1981)
(summarizing appellants' attempt to calculate a constitutional ceiling on coal excise
taxes from the net marginal cost to the state government per ton of coal mined).
169

Id.

Id. at 627 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445
(1979))).
17
See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
172 Under the broadest reading of Commonwealth Edison, any tax rate is acceptable so long as it is proportional to nonresidents' contact with the taxing state and the
tax is zero when the activity is zero. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 626-29.
In other words, if the tax can be graphed as a straight line with the equation
y=mx+b, (m equals the tax rate, x equals the nonresident taxpayer's contact with the
state, b is the tax when x-0, and y is the tax thus calculated), then the tax is constitutional if b=0, no matter how steep m may be.
173 See id. at 627 (asserting that "the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essen170
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monwealth Edison Court apply to states' assessments of the value of
1 74
their waste acceptance services.

c.

Discriminatory Taxation

Intrastate transportation of solid waste has costs of its own,17' and
states are entitled to recover them.176 In many geographical configurations, exogenous waste may travel a greater average distance within the
receiving state than does endogenous waste. Absent that distinction,
however, the third branch of the Complete Auto Transit test177 would
17
render such a discriminatory tax unconstitutional. 1

3.

Reciprocal Symmetry

A holdout state that requires little waste reduction of its residents,
and relies instead on its more conservationist neighbors' disposal facilities, will attract jobs in waste-generating industries. Similarly, a state
tially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution").
The Commonwealth Edison Court gave great deference to Montana's determination of the per-ton tax rate both because courts lack the expertise to understand "the
numerous and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political considerations that must inform [such] a decision," id. at 628, and because taxation is a
political question that "must be resolved through the political process." See id. The
factual and technical issues involved in solid waste regulation are no less complex.
More importantly, the valuation in dollar terms of environmental quality is an extremely sensitive political issue. For courts to assume the responsibility for that evaluation would damage their legitimacy. Cf Mulhern, In Defense of Political Question
Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 164-68 (1988) (discussing the importance of judicial
deference in modern constitutional law).
"' For a particularly blunt example, see Peterson, Motorists' Deaths Prompt an
Uproar On GarbageTrucks atJersey Landfill, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at B2, col.
1 (describing an accident involving a truck carrying out-of-county garbage to controversial Edgeboro Landfill; the accident left six dead and provoked an uproar among residents of East Brunswick, New Jersey).
"' Ohio has recently tried to push discriminatory taxation to its constitutional
limit. It has imposed small statewide per-ton tipping fees that vary by the origin of the
waste ($0.50 for waste from within the disposing solid waste management district,
$1.00 for waste from another Ohio district, and $1.50 for waste from out of state; each
17"

figure will rise by $0.20 over two years). See

OHIo REv. CODE ANN.

§ 3734(A) (An-

derson 1988). Moneys thus collected will be reserved for hazardous waste management
and cleanup. See id. It has also authorized the county-level solid waste management
districts to impose additional three-tiered fees in the same 1:2:3 ratio; money from the
discriminatory last third of the fee on out-of-state waste is reserved exclusively for inspecting such waste. See id. §§ 3734.57 (B), (E)(6); see also Celebrezze, State Solid
Waste Regulation and the Commerce Clause: Ohio's Initiative on a National Problem, 1 V.I.E.W. PRoc. 49, 51-52 (1988); Kelly, supra note 6, at 18.
17 See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
"78 See Note, supra note 162, at 55-56 (predicting that a discriminatory fee bill
introduced in the New Jersey assembly would not survive constitutional scrutiny because "[n]o state, through taxation, may attempt to give a competitive advantage to
local business to the detriment of out-of-state business").
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that refuses to site disposal facilities and relies instead on its neighbors'
facilities will avoid both environmental externalities and political headaches. Fear of these outcomes may lead states to bar disposal facilities
from exporting capacity to states with less burdensome waste reduction
requirements or less aggressive siting policies. 1 9 The courts should
generally uphold such symmetry requirements.
The symmetry requirements posited here must be distinguished
from the reciprocity requirements that the Supreme Court has in two
recent cases found violative of the commerce clause. In Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell,'"0 the Court struck down a Mississippi
regulation against importing milk produced in states that did not reciprocally accept Mississippi milk. ls l In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas,82 the Court extended its condemnation of reciprocity requirements to include export limitations.1 8 3 In both cases, the Court held
that reciprocity requirements cannot be justified as a means to ward off
protectionism, so long as the courts and the dormant commerce clause
remain available to exorcise it completely. But while the courts can
strike down protectionist laws, they lack the power and the institutional
competence to order states to produce less waste and to site more disposal facilities. Thus a symmetry requirement may have a legitimate purpose-that of preventing states from free-riding on their neighbors'
efforts.1 4
Nonetheless, symmetry requirements might be attacked an attempts by one state to foist onto its neighbors its own judgments as to
optimal levels of waste reduction and disposal.' 85 This argument has
'79 Cf infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text (discussing an Oklahoma statute forbidding waste importation from states lacking disposal standards substantially
similar to Oklahoma's).
1so 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
181 See id. at 381. Mississippi required imported milk to be inspected under standards "substantially equivalent" to Mississippi's. The law also required states exporting milk to Mississippi to accept Mississippi milk meeting the accepting state's own
health and safety standards. See id. at 367-68 n.1, 367-77 n.9.
182

458 U.S. 941 (1982).

See id. at 957-58. Concerned about depletion of the Oglalla aquifer, Nebraska
restricted withdrawal of groundwater from in-state wells. It barred withdrawal for export to any state which did not export an equal quantity of water to Nebraska. See id.
at 944.
184 See Regan, supra note 22, at 1271 (suggesting that denying landfill space to
all entities, local or not, that fail to comply with waste reduction measures is not purposeful discrimination and should be allowed).
185 See, e.g., GreatAtl. & Pac. Tea Co., 424 U.S. at 381 (arguing that states are
not permitted under the commerce clause to force their own judgments on other states
"at the pain of an absolute ban" on interstate commerce); see also Regan, supra note
22, at 1271 (stating that while symmetry requirements should be permitted, their extraterritoriality may "raise eyebrows").
183
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two elements. One is that courts should allow states to internalize externalities only through excise taxes.18 6 The strengths and limitations of
that argument have already been discussed.'
Also implicit, however, is an argument that any attempt to reshape
the incentives surrounding other states' legislative decisions is illegitimate. The Tenth Circuit appears to have been moved by this argument
in striking down an Oklahoma law 8 excluding hazardous industrial
wastes originating in states that had not enacted "substantially similar
standards" for their disposal.' 89 This argument makes no sense in the
modern legal universe that gives the states power to decide whether to
adopt a free market or regulatory approach' 90 Every regulation and
every regulatory vacuum shapes the incentives affecting other political
entities. Oklahoma's neighbors could as easily be accused of enacting
laissez-faire standards for hazardous waste disposal that "reach[] out
and seek[] to force the enactment"' 9 by Oklahoma of a statute with
low standards similar to their own.' 9 2 Given this relativity, to label a
state as an aggressor solely because it is the first to move from laissezfaire to regulation is to turn the commerce clause back into a tool for
exposing state governments to the efficiency-maximizing wind stirred
by the mobility of capital.' 3
186 Rather than ration disposal capacity to residents of equally conservationist/
aggressive states, a state could sell it at a price high enough to compensate the state for
all its costs. Its neighbors could then decide whether they wish to pay that price or to
step up their own waste reduction and/or facility siting efforts. See supra text accom-

panying notes 158-63.
187 As already noted, see supra text accompanying notes 164-74, the free-rider
problem might also be remediable through excise taxes. However, when there exists a
genuine shortage of disposal capacity, an administrable excise tax might not adequately
slow the flow of waste into the state. In such circumstances, some form of rationing
may be required. A symmetry requirement is a justifiable way to prefer those nonresidents who are working to alleviate the shortage over those who are not.
188

See OKLA.STAT. tit.

63, § 2764 (Supp. 1978).

.89See Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1980) (Hardage I1)
(holding unconstitutional a requirement that waste-exporting state's disposal laws be
"substantially similar" to receiving state's laws, even divorced from a reciprocity requirement that the exporting state accept Oklahoma waste); Hardage v. Atkins, 582
F.2d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 1978) (Hardage1) (holding that those two requirements

taken together violate dormant commerce clause).
190 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 1-2 & n.1.
9 Hardage II, 619 F.2d at 873.
...From all that appears in the several opinions resulting from this case,
Oklahoma may have feared the loss of industry to states with looser disposal standards,
the loss of disposal capacity to states with tighter disposal standards, or both. The discussion assumes the first of these possibilities.
183 See R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A

21-22 (1941) (stating that special economic
interests may masquerade as states' rights arguments); ef.Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 255 (1918) (argument for appellant) (unsuccessfully urging the Court to
uphold congressional prohibition on interstate commerce in the products of child labor
CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS
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County Self-Sufficiency

Right alongside the trend towards statewide solid waste planning
successfully promoted by Congress,194 a trend has arisen towards states
encouraging or requiring that their political subdivisions-typically
counties-dispose of their own waste.1 95 States of course have the police
power to regulate the intrastate flow of endogenously generated
waste.196 A dormant commerce clause issue arises, however, when taxes
or prohibitions on the disposal of out-of-district waste are applied not
only to waste coming from areas of the state outside the receiving subdivision, but to waste from other states.
The mere fact that such statutes do not mention state boundaries
in so many words will not save them from commerce clause attack.
Either because they come so close as to be indistinguishable from statutes that purposefully discriminate on their face,' 97 or because they
have a clearly discriminatory effect, 9 ' they are subject to the strict
scrutiny of "virtual[] per se . . . invalidity.' 99
States that can demonstrate "some reason, apart from their origin,
on grounds that nationwide competition made regulation by individual states impossible, and conceding that for the same reason a state law "forbidding entrance into the
State of goods made by children of an age lower than that at which the State itself
permits young persons to work would perhaps be valid in the absence of congressional
legislation"), overruled United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (noting that
the "power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article
from interstate commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution").
194 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-86 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988)).
1'5 See, e.g., Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51
N.Y.2d 679, 684-85, 417 N.E.2d 78, 80-81, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968-69.(1980) (upholding against commerce clause attack a municipal ban on disposing of out-of-town waste
in the town's privately-owned landfill); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-138(c) (West 1988)
(imposing a tax on the importation of solid waste into a county solid waste management district of $1 per ton in 1985, rising to $4 per ton in 1988, and increasing by $2
each year thereafter).
18 See, e.g., City of Elizabeth v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 198 N.J. Super.
41, 50-52, 486 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1984) (upholding state regulation of intrastate waste
flow); Monroe, 51 N.Y.2d at 684-85, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (finding
an ordinance excluding out-of-town refuse to be a legitimate exercise of the town's
police power); see also Central Iowa Refuse Sys. Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid
Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985) (agency requirement that all waste generated in metropolitan area flow to its landfill is state
action exempt from antitrust scrutiny).
197 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618, 628-29 (1978); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Regan, supra note 22, at
1229-30.
198 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1970).
199 See Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
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differently" ' 0 out-of-state waste can, however, avoid such

scrutiny2 '

and come in under the easier "balancing" test of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.2" 2 New Jersey secured an injunction closing Kinsley Landfill to Philadelphia during a shortage of disposal capacity (thus
winning the war whose first battle Philadelphia had won in the Supreme Court) by establishing that Philadelphia waste was different.
New Jersey convinced state trial and appellate judges that Philadelphia
was better able than the towns of the host county to find alternative
disposal sites.2"' Externalities caused by the mere transportation of
waste might also differentiate out-of-state and local waste.20 4 Whether
to recognize the costs engendered by parochial sentiments as providing
a distinction between local and outside waste is more problematic.20 5
Absent such factors, however, county self-sufficiency statutes
should be evaluated for dormant commerce clause purposes as though
their only effect were on other states. From the perspective of other
states, with which a properly comity-oriented court 0 6 should empathize, it is little consolation that a resource-rich neighbor has compartmentalized its wealth.20 7 The present inquiry thus collapses into
that pursued above.
Ohio has recently adopted legislation that is likely to prevent any
significant increase in importation, but should nonetheless survive dormant commerce clause scrutiny. Under the "service area" concept advanced by Ohio Attorney General Anthony Celebrezze, Jr., each disposal facility will normally serve only a designated area, drawn to fit into
a statewide coordination plan.2 " While the service area limitations are
required to be consistent with ten-year projections of waste importation,20 9 the law may effectively prevent all but established exogenous
200 See id. at 627.

2I

See id.; cf United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.

208, 222 (1984) (finding a similar distinction in privileges & immunities- clause

analysis).
202 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see supra note 82.
See Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd., 100 N.J. 134, 145-47,
495 A.2d 49, 55-56 (1985).
204 See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
201 See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217
n.9 (1983); see also id. at 232 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing this issue in
the privileges and immunities clause context).
208 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3734.53(c)(1) (Anderson 1988) (empowering
waste management districts to exclude waste from outside the district-presumably including from other states-subject to preemption by the director of environmental protection); Celebrezze, supra note 176, at 51-52.
209 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.53 (A)(6), (C)(1) (Anderson 1988).
201
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sources from using Ohio's capacity.2 10 But this law should (narrowly)
survive constitutional attack.21 ' A statewide coordination plan will generate real statewide public goods by extending and creating disposal
capacity. Ohio should be allowed to keep what it creates.
5.

Federal Regulation

In addition to its preemption power, Congress has "broad power
to consent to state laws that would, in the absence of such consent,
impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce." 2 ' To date,
Congress has simply given the states a few small incentives to cooperate, with little effect. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of

1976 ("RCRA") 213 encouraged the formation of waste disposal regions
transcending state boundaries.21 4 Over the past decade, Congress appropriated $165 million 21 5 for states with acceptable solid waste disposal plans.21 6 In its implementing regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency recommends, but does not require, that "[t]he State plan
. . . provide for substate cooperation and policies for free and unrestricted movement of solid and hazardous waste across State and local

boundaries."2'17
Federal involvement will soon increase markedly. The Environmental Protection Agency is in the process of promulgating comprehensive performance standards for siting, operating, and closing landfills
that receive household waste, as well as disclosure requirements for
210 Out-of-state generators who someday want to increase their shipments to Ohio
may well find that service area planners have left no room for them. Moreover, the law
also freezes the daily tonnage each facility can accept until solid waste districts are
established. See H.B. 592, § 6 (C), 117th Gen. Assembly, 1988 Ohio Legis. Bull. 54041 (Anderson), reprinted following OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.52 (Anderson
1988).
211 Cf Kelly, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that Celebrezze proposal was advanced
as a modification of an outright blockade in order to save it from commerce clause
attack).
212 Hellerstein, supra note 118, at 55; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
An admittedly weak argument could be made that by not exercising its special power
over the District of Columbia to repeal the ordinance banning exogenous waste from
district-owned landfills, see supra text accompanying note 15, Congress has affirmatively endorsed parallel state laws.
211 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988)).
214 See 42 U.S.C. § 6946 (1982). That RCRA did not preempt state regulation of
solid waste, including import restrictions, was a secondary holding of Philadelphiav.
New Jersey.
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978).
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 6948 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
218 The criteria for acceptable plans are set out at 42 U.S.C. § 6943 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
21" 40 C.F.R. § 256.42(h) (1988).
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landfills that accept only commercial solid waste.21 These regulations
could become effective as early as 1990. Active federal involvement in
regulating disposal safety-and thereby making siting easier-is not
necessary to justify federal regulation under the positive commerce
clause."1 9 It may, however, diminish states' claims of the right to control disposal capacity within their territory. As the regulations currently
stand, however, the states would retain primary responsibility for enforcing disposal standards, and would be allowed to impose standards
more stringent than EPA's.2 2 °
Future regulations or acts of Congress could, for example, encourage recycling,"' impose minimum tipping fees, hasten disposal facility construction, 2 require the formation of interstate compacts,2 23
establish multi-state disposal regions, or establish a liability rule under
which states would be required to accept out-of-state generators' waste
at a price determined by a third party.2 2'
See EPA Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314 (1988)
(to be codified, if adopted, at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257, 258) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988) [hereinafter EPA Criteria]. Significantly, landfill operators would be required to ensure that
they will have adequate funds available to pay for correcting known releases, closing
the.site, and caring for it after closure. See id. at 33,347-51; 33,3409-10 (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 258.32).
219 Waste disposal clearly has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Note,
however, that National League of Cities stated in dictum that "sanitation" is a "traditional governmental function." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 85152 (1976).
220 See EPA Criteria, supra note 218, at 33,381-83 ("EPA expects the states to
assume the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the revised criteria,
and a major EPA enforcement program is not envisioned. . . .[unless] states fail to
assume their responsibility."); id. at 33,405 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.1) (noting that the purpose of regulation is "to establish minimum national criteria . . . for
municipal solid waste landfills") (emphasis added).
221 See Recommendations for EPA's RCRA Program, Inside EPA's Envt'l Pol'y
Alert, Dec. 28, 1988, at 6, 6-9 (summarizing the pro-recycling platform presented by a
coalition of thirty groups to the presidential transition team).
218

222
MENTAL

Cf OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONPROTECTION

AGENCY,

ASSURANCE OF HAZARDOUS

WASTE

CAPACITY:

4 (1988) (fleshing out the requirements of
§ 104(c)(9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, under which federal Superfund money will soon be spent only in states able
to assure EPA that they will maintain adequate capacity to dispose of their own hazardous wastes).
22 See Florini, supra note 127, at 334-36 (suggesting the use of interstate compacts to deal with hazardous wastes); Kelly, supra note 6, at 18 (As part of his proposal, Ohio Attorney General Celebrezze "advocates that Congress amend RCRA to require that garbage be moved only between states that had entered a regional
compact."). Note that this approach has been followed for low-level radioactive waste
disposal. See supra note 10.
2 See SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 130, at 48-52 (recommending that
while federal involvement should continue to be more limited than the states', EPA
should promulgate landfill performance standards, support research, provide increased
GUIDANCE
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CONCLUSION

Within the last few generations, we have come to "can awareness
that the very structure of our society depends upon a continuing flow of
self-conscious decisions made by politically accountable state officials."2 5 As humanity's power to either destroy or sustain environmental resources grows, we must assume a similar activist responsibility for
nature. Shaping dormant commerce jurisprudence to enhance states'
ability to benefit from responsible management of their natural resources would meet a small part of that ongoing challenge.

technical assistance, help states expedite siting, and promote source reduction and
recycling).
225 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 1.

